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Abstract The death toll of recent heat waves in developed 
countries has been remarkably high, contradicting the com-
mon assumption that high levels of economic and technologi-
cal development automatically lead to lower vulnerability 
to weather extremes. Future climate change may further 
increase this vulnerability. In this article we examine some 
recent evidence of heat wave-related mortality and we con-
clude that while economic wealth and technological capacity 
might be a necessary condition for adequately coping 
with adverse climate change effects, they are not sufficient. 
Questions of awareness, preparedness, organizational 
issues, and actor networks have to be addressed in a pro-
active and focused manner in order to avoid future heat wave 
damages. We propose some practical consequences for heat 
wave adaptation measures by adopting a risk governance 
framework that can be universally applied, as it is sufficiently 
flexible to deal with the multi-level and often fragmented 
reality of existing coping measures. 
Keywords climate change adaptation, early warning 
systems, heat waves, risk governance, risk management
1 Introduction
Climate change is already underway and will continue in the 
future. Measurements show that Global Mean Temperature 
(GMT) has already increased by 0.76°C compared to 
pre-industrial levels, and the climate system is committed to 
an additional increase of 0.6°C due to historic emissions 
(IPCC 2007). Given the recent growth in global greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions (GCP 2010), this temperature increase 
will only be the lower boundary of what the future will 
bring. 
While national and international climate policies that 
aim to reduce global GHG emissions are essential in order to 
prevent climate change and related impacts from becoming 
disastrous, human societies will have to adapt to changing 
climatic conditions. 
Climate change has many different adverse impacts, with 
melting ice caps and rising sea levels being most probably 
the most severe ones in the very long run. In the short run, 
weather-related disasters such as droughts, floods, and storms 
play an important role. Worldwide, the number of disaster 
losses in monetary terms (both insured and uninsured) has 
increased in recent years but it is still debated whether (and, 
if yes, to what extend) climate change has contributed to this 
increase (Bouwer 2011). However, climate science warns us 
that increasing mean values—such as GMT—come with 
an increased risk of weather extremes in the future: “In a 
warmer future climate, there will be an increased risk of more 
intense, more frequent and longer-lasting heat waves. The 
European heat wave of 2003 is an example of the type of 
extreme heat event lasting from several days to over a week 
that is likely to become more common in a warmer future 
climate.” (IPCC 2007, 783).
This article focuses on hot spells and heat waves as perti-
nent disasters, and as events with a risk of higher frequencies 
and intensities due to climate change. Various heat wave 
events in the recent past, which led to numerous deaths, have 
raised the attention of both scientists and decision makers 
across the globe. Here, we examine this issue from an 
integrated risk governance perspective. We focus on Europe, 
although heat waves do frequently occur in other continents 
where many countries often are perceived to have much 
lower coping capacities. This is exactly why we find Europe 
a very interesting case. Usually, developing countries are 
perceived as being both most exposed and most vulnerable 
to climate change, while developed countries—despite their 
responsibility in terms of high actual and historic emissions—
seem to be neither especially exposed nor particularly vulner-
able due to their technological, organizational, and financial 
capacities to cope with adverse effects of climate change. In 
particular the heat wave events of 2003 and 2010 in Europe 
lead us to correct these underlying assumptions. It seems 
that even the most advanced countries need to rethink their 
existing risk governance structures. 
Against this background, this article develops an integrate d 
risk governance framework for heat waves in Europe, based 
upon European experiences with recent heat waves as well 
as with existing coping strategies. The rest of this article 
is organized as follows: After a characterization of heat 
waves, their recent occurrence, and their future developments 
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(section 2), we look at existing coping strategies (especially 
early warning systems) in Europe (section 3). Based on this 
background, we then present a risk governance perspective 
and apply it to heat waves (section 4). The final section draws 
some conclusions and links the heat wave case to the wider 
picture of climate policy. 
2 Heat Waves in Europe: Characteristics, 
Recent Events, and Future Trends
Heat, or anomalously hot weather, that lasts for several days, 
often codified as heat waves, has a clear impact on societies 
including a rise in mortality and morbidity. Heat waves also 
place an increased strain on infrastructure (power, water, and 
transport), with monetary damages rising continuously. This 
text focuses on the impacts on human health, namely mortal-
ity. One would expect European societies to be rather well 
prepared when it comes to climate change adaptation, but the 
evidence presented in this article raises some doubt about this 
assumption. 
2.1 Characteristics
A heat wave is a prolonged period of excessively hot weather, 
which may be accompanied by high humidity. There is no 
universal definition of a heat wave (Souch and Grimmond 
2006; Robinson 2001). The term is relative to the usual 
weather in the area. Temperatures that people from a hotter 
climate consider normal can be termed a heat wave in a 
cooler area if they are outside the normal climate pattern 
for that area. The definition recommended by the World 
Meteorological Organization is when the daily maximum 
temperature of more than five consecutive days exceeds 
the average maximum temperature by 5 Celsius degrees 
(9 Fahrenheit degrees), the normal period being 1961–1990 
(Frich et al. 2002). 
Increased summer heat does have various critical effects 
for natural, semi-natural, technical, and social systemsi: 
 Natural systems may come under heat and water stress, 
leading to losses of functions and a reduction of ecosys-
tem service deliveries (such as water purification). Some 
wild living animals are more susceptible to infectious 
diseases under heat stress conditions (Seppälä and Jokela 
2011). Despite certainly very important attempts to 
monetize ecosystem goods and services (Costanza et al. 
1997; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), it is hard 
to quantify damages due to external shocks. This makes 
risk management strategies difficult—even if we leave 
aside the question of whether human intervention in 
largely unmanaged ecosystems can at all reduce risks. 
 Semi-natural systems can experience the same or even 
larger stress effects, such as forest fires or crop losses.ii 
This makes quantitative and monetized damage estimates 
much easier, and we find systems of risk management 
(including disaster induced crop loss insurances) already 
in place. 
 Technical systems are vulnerable towards heat stress, and 
many of them are technically protected against it (for 
instance, cooling systems for buildings, trucks, or com-
puters). Usually, technical systems have standard ranges 
of “normal” functioning, beyond of which the risk of 
malfunction increases. Transport infrastructures such as 
streets or railways are repeatedly damaged during heat 
stress periods.
 Social actors and systems are equally “tuned” towards 
normal ranges of weather patterns, including frequently 
occurring weather extremes. Beyond these limits, which 
vary from system to system and from actor to actor, they 
become vulnerable to damages (McMichael, Woodruff, 
and Hales 2006). 
Heat waves do carry sustained heat loads to the human 
body and have discernible impacts on human health (Kovats 
and Jendritzky 2006; Dhainaut et al. 2004). They affect 
well-being and limit the normal functioning of humans, and 
can stress the cardiovascular system. 
Unlike air pollution the effects of temperature on mortality 
cannot be assumed to follow a general linear form. In popula-
tions with a temperate climate, a general U- or V-shaped 
relationship exists between daily mortality counts and 
temperature, with deaths increasing as temperatures fall, as 
well as when temperatures rise above population-specific 
threshold values (Curriero et al. 2002; Hajat et al. 2010; 
Kovats and Hajat 2008). These stress-mortality curves vary 
from region to region. Despite this variance, a couple of risk 
factors increase heat wave damage probabilities:
 Factors affecting exposure (such as working outside or 
residing in a retirement home without air-conditioning);
 Factors affecting sensitivity to a given heat exposure (such 
as age, sex, health condition, or body mass); and
 Factors affecting access to treatment (such as lack of 
information or medication).
Empirical studies reveal that infants and elderly people 
(especially 75+) are particularly vulnerable to heat waves—
mostly due to all three factors mentioned (Conti 2011; Koppe 
2005; Kovats and Hajat 2008; Simón et al. 2005; Schifano et 
al. 2009). Vulnerability to heat wave is significantly increased 
due to pre-existing respiratory and cardiovascular diseases 
(D’Ippoliti et al. 2010; Patz et al. 2005). There is a significant 
social component of vulnerability. This component is an 
important factor for explaining some variance in mortality 
between different European cities during the 2003 heat wave 
(D’Ippoliti et al. 2010). Another empirical evidence is that 
women tend to be more at risk than men, although the 
evidence here is less clear. While U.S. studies show that low 
socioeconomic status is associated with higher mortality 
risks, data for Europe do not reveal this connection (with 
some exceptions: Michelozzi et al. 2005), most probably due 
to the better provisioning of social services in Europe. 
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People living in urban environments are at greater risk 
than those in non-urban regions. Recent studies for European 
cities revealed that heat waves of long duration had the 
greatest impact on mortality, and resulted in 1.5 to 3 times 
higher daily mortality than other periods (D’Ippoliti et al. 
2010). Worldwide we live in an increasingly urbanized 
society, urban heat island effects underline and reinforce the 
relevance of heat waves for the risk management of modern 
societies. Thermally inefficient housing and the so-called 
urban heat island effect (whereby inner urban environments, 
with high thermal mass and low ventilation, absorb and retain 
heat) amplify and extend the rise in temperatures (especially 
overnight) (McGeehin and Mirabelli 2001). 
In 2003 in Paris many nursing homes and other assisted-
living and retirement communities were not air-conditioned, 
and elderly residents might not have been promptly moved to 
air-conditioned shelters and rehydrated with fluids (Dhainaut 
et al. 2004). Hübler, Klepper, and Peterson (2007) have made 
an attempt to calculate the economic damage of more summer 
heat days for Germany in the 2071–2100 period, with GDP 
losses due to reduced labor productivity being more severe 
than increased hospitality costs. 
2.2 Recent Events in Heat Wave Induced Mortality in 
Europe
In this section, we would like to focus on the death toll of heat 
waves, excluding other aspects from our analysis. The reason 
for this focus is twofold: (1) despite some methodological 
difficulties that we address below, counting the victims is a 
rather clear cut task, and can thus be regarded as a simple but 
powerful metric for risk analysis; and (2) the loss of human 
lives is a meaningful measure for detrimental social and 
economic impacts of extreme weather and, possibly, climate 
events (Lissner et al. 2011). While one can doubt whether it is 
methodologically feasible and/or ethically acceptable to 
translate deaths into monetary equivalents, the unit “victims” 
can easily be understood in all societies and cultures, whether 
or not they are used to monetize risk. Besides the loss of 
human capital, dead people mean a humanitarian loss, a 
private tragedy, and possibly a social disaster far beyond 
economic evaluation.
The most important recent heat wave in Europe occurred 
in July and August 2003. The summer of 2003 was probably 
the hottest in Europe since AD 1500. Temperature anomalies 
were 5–10 K above average summer values (Fink et al. 2004). 
Maximum temperatures of 35 to 40°C were repeatedly 
recorded and peak temperatures climbed well above 40°C 
(André et al. 2004; Beniston and Díaz 2004).
The heat wave was accompanied by annual precipitation 
deficits up to 300 mm. This drought contributed to an esti-
mated 30 percent reduction in gross primary production of 
terrestrial ecosystems over Europe (Ciais et al. 2005). This 
reduced agricultural production and increased production 
costs, generating estimated damages of more than €13 billion 
(Fink et al. 2004). Unusually large numbers of heat-related 
deaths were reported in France, Germany, Italy, and other 
countries. A Pan-European research project came up with 
more than 70,000 additional dead people due to this event 
(Robine et al. 2008).
While the summer of 2006 was also very hot, a new record 
event was the summer of 2010, hitting Eastern Europe and 
Northern Asia especially hard. Many wildfires occurred 
in Russia, leading to heavy smoke around big cities, most 
notably Moscow. Daily maximum temperatures reached 
40°C, and the combined effect of heat and smoke led to 11,000 
additional deaths in Moscow alone. For Russia as a whole, 
the death toll of the 2010 summer heat wave totaled 55,000 
people (Swiss Re 2011). 
The heat waves of 2003 and 2010 reveal that European 
societies with very different economic, social, and political 
settings are vulnerable to extreme weather events. If we 
choose the metric of mortality, climate risks seem to pose 
serious problems for European societies, whatever their level 
of development might be. 
2.3 Future Trends: Heat Waves and Climate Change
It is impossible to project from a single event to large-scale 
trends. In particular it is not valid to deduce a shift in the 
global climate from, say, the European heat waves of 2003 
and 2010. Would these two events form our only knowledge 
base, climate change would be a gamy hypothesis, if not pure 
speculation. 
Figure 1. Difference in land surface temperature between 
2003 and the average of 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2004, using 
TERRA MODIS; data range: 20 July–20 August
Source: Stöckli, Simmon, and Herring 2011.
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But we do have much more than these mega-events to 
update our expectations regarding the future climate. Deeper 
analysis of the 2003 heat wave, using longer time series, 
comes to the conclusion that it can be regarded as extremely 
unusual under the dominant European climate conditions of 
the twentieth century, while under conditions of climate 
change it might become more frequent (Beniston and Diaz 
2004). In a Bayesian breakpoint analysis, Siliverstovs et al. 
(2009) find that since the early 1980s return times of Swiss 
heat waves decreased by an order of magnitude. While Schär 
et al. (2004), Stott, Stone, and Allen (2004), and Jaeger et al. 
(2008) suppose a specific contribution of anthropogenic 
climate change for recent heat-related weather extremes, 
Chase et al. (2006) are more careful and try to show that 
such events occur regularly even under current climatic 
conditions. 
If we focus on time development, changes seem to acceler-
ate. Hansen et al. (2010) have already detected an increase in 
warm temperature anomalies in the last four decades. This is 
supported by an analysis of observational data from the 
1901–2003 period on temperature extremes (Alexander et al. 
2006), revealing that in most stations cold days and nights 
have decreased, while hot days and nights have increased 
during the last 100 years. 
These shifts in temperature patterns also shift the probabil-
ities of extremes. In Frankfurt am Main (Germany) for 
example, between 1901 and 2006 the probability of a very 
high monthly mean temperature in August (T > 22°C) has 
increased from 0.1 percent to 16.2 percent (Schönwiese 
2007).
The majority of meteorologists and climate change experts 
believe that an increase of average temperatures will lead to 
an increase in extremes, which also holds for heat waves 
(Barriopedro et al. 2011; Beniston et al. 2007; Meehl and 
Tebaldi 2004). The extreme summer of 2003, very unusual 
under the climate conditions of the late twentieth century, will 
become a normal summer at about 2050, and a rather cold 
summer at around 2100. The IPCC (2007) assumes it to be 
“very likely” (> 90 percent) that the frequency of heat waves 
will increase over most land areas. 
Shifting climate regimes will shift annual weather pat-
terns, which may have an effect on mortality. Mortality is 
high at both ends of the temperature curve: extreme cold and 
extreme warm conditions have their death toll. As climate 
change leads to both warmer winter and summer conditions, 
the question arises what the net effect of reduced winter and 
increased summer mortality will be. McMichael, Woodruff, 
and Hales (2006) assume the net effect to be positive in num-
bers, i.e. the increase in summer heat deaths will outweigh the 
reduction in winter mortality.iii
An integrative research project on climate change impacts 
on Europe (Ciscar 2009; Ciscar et al. 2011) has also assessed 
the health impacts. Using a SRES A2 scenario, it states that in 
the 2020s, without adaptation measures and acclimatization, 
the estimated increases in heat-related mortality are projected 
to be lower than the estimated decrease in cold-related 
mortality. The potential increase in heat-related mortality in 
Europe could be over 25,000 extra deaths per year, with the 
rate of increase potentially higher in south Central Europe 
and southern European regions more generally. Physiological 
and behavioral responses to the warmer climate could have a 
very significant effect in reducing this mortality (acclimatiza-
tion), potentially reducing the estimates by a factor of five 
to ten. By the 2080s, the effect of heat- and cold-related 
mortality changes depends on the set of exposure-response 
and acclimatization functions used. The range of estimates for 
the increase in mortality is between 60,000 and 165,000 
(without acclimatization), again decreasing by a factor of five 
or more if acclimatization is included.
According to the Stern Review, the increase in average 
annual temperature, and in particular the increases in peak 
summer temperatures, will result in an increase in heat-
related deaths, mainly in southern Europe. Under a 2°C 
scenario, the number of heat-related deaths in urban areas 
could increase 2–3 times. Heat-related deaths could reach 
50,000 a year under the B2 scenario and 100,000 a year under 
the A2 scenario in 2100 (Stern 2006, 133). 
So far, existing figures for heat wave-related deaths in 
Europe have been worrying. Given the combined effects of 
demographic change, urbanization, and climate change, the 
future will be even more alarming. Of course societies and 
individual actors can adapt to changing weather conditions. 
Once they learn from the adverse impacts of past events, they 
can reduce their vulnerability by a broad range of adaptive 
measures. Up to now, we have not explicitly addressed this 
important issue. It is thus time to do so in the next section. 
3 European Heat Wave Coping Strategies
Heat health warning systems (HHWS) are the most promi-
nent response to heat waves worldwide. The overall aim of an 
HHWS is to alert decision makers and the general public of 
impending dangerous hot weather and to serve as a source of 
advice on how to avoid negative health outcomes associated 
with hot weather extremes. Typically HHWS are composed 
of a number of elements, which include weather forecasting, 
a method for assessing how future weather patterns may play 
out in terms of a range of health outcomes, determination 
of heat stress thresholds for action, a system of graded alerts/
actions for communication to the general population or 
specific target groups about a pending period of heat and 
its intensity, and advice to government agencies about the 
possible severity of health impacts. 
Since the implementation of the inaugural HHWS in the 
city of Philadelphia, USA, in 1995, a large amount of interna-
tional experience has accumulated regarding the development 
of HHWS. Before 2001, only one HHWS was operational 
in Europe (Lisbon). In 2000, the World Meteorological 
Organization chose Rome as a pilot city for the development 
and implementation of an air-mass based HHWS, which 
became fully operational in summer 2001. The high numbers 
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of heat-related deaths in summer 2003 across Europe, how-
ever, resulted in an increase in the number of HHWS. By 
2006, HHWS were operational in 16 countries, most of them 
introduced after the 2003 heat wave, and by 2009 28 HHWS 
were operational in Europe (Liukaityte and Koppe 2009). 
HHWS vary significantly with respect to the methodolo-
gies and operational definitions of warning triggers (e.g., for 
critical temperature thresholds), both worldwide and in 
Europe, leaving room for improvement and more coordina-
tion (Bassil et al. 2007; Kalkstein, Sherman, and Kalkstein 
2009; McGregor et al. 2010; NHS 2006; Nogueira 2005). 
Hajat et al. (2010) examined 4 commonly used trigger-setting 
approaches: (1) synoptic classification; (2) epidemiologic 
assessment of the temperature–mortality relationship; (3) 
temperature–humidity index; and (4) physiologic classifi-
cation. They applied each approach in Chicago, Illinois; 
London, United Kingdom; Madrid, Spain; and Montreal, 
Canada, to identify those days expected to be associated with 
the highest heat-related mortality. They found little agree-
ment on which days were identified as most dangerous among 
the various approaches. In general, days identified by a 
temperature–mortality approach have been associated with 
the highest excess mortality. 
Heat health warning systems are often part of a wider 
heat plan. These heat plans embrace the HHWS itself, but 
additionally consider a whole set of strategy elements: 
education and awareness raising; heat event preparedness and 
guidance on heat avoidance actions and heat risk governance; 
a communication plan, a program of evaluation; a health 
surveillance system; and advice on longer term strategies 
for reducing heat risk. European heat plans vary widely in 
structure, partner agencies, and specific interventions. The 
majority of the existing heat-health action plans are organized 
on a national level (England, France, Portugal, and Hungary) 
with regional components. But several are implemented on 
a regional and local level (Catalonia, Spain; Lazio, Italy; 
Federal States of Germany). Almost all systems were initiated 
and designed by the ministry of health as the lead agency and 
all had an official link to the national meteorological service. 
The systems in Italy, France, and Hungary had a legal basis 
and Hungary, England, and Catalonia described a link to the 
national disaster plan. Most heat health warnings in Europe 
are issued by the national meteorological offices. The com-
munication campaigns are mostly the responsibility of the 
ministries or departments of health, or institutes of public 
health, in collaboration with the health services. Behavioral 
and medical advice is launched through health services, 
general practitioners, and pharmacies. Hospital and care home 
managers, as well as their staff, ensure the implementation of 
specific measures in their facilities. General practitioners and 
health centers, as well as social services, are often the main 
partners responsible for the care of people at risk (Matthies 
Figure 2. Operational Heat Health Warning Systems (HHWS) in Europe (status 2009); The figure shows the different 
methodological thresholds used for initialization of early warning. Legend: Tmax: maximum temperature; Tmean: mean 
temperature; Tmin: minimum temperature; AT: apparent temperature; T: Temperature; RH: relative humidity; PT: perceived 
temperature; ?: not known.
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and Menne 2009). Table 1 gives an overview of different 
measures and strategies that existing HHWS and heat plans 
include.
While it is difficult to assess the efficiency of these 
systems, some agencies report about their interventions at the 
end of the summer season. A case study of the French early 
warning system, comparing the mortalities of the 2006 heat 
wave to that of 2003 concludes that the implementation 
of HHWS in France after the 2003 event did contribute to a 
reduction in the numbers of victims (Fouillet et al. 2008). In 
contrast, the death toll of the summer 2006 heat wave in many 
other European countries with HHWS in place shows that 
there are still gaps in implementation, and that many 
European countries have not yet developed sufficient actions 
(WHO Europe 2008a). 
Triggered by the European heat wave in 2003, several 
research projects have been launched that do address heat 
wave impacts—among other climate change impacts—on 
European societies and their ecosystems. One of these proj-
ects, EuroHEAT, was coordinated by the Global Change and 
Health program of the WHO Regional Office for Europe 
and co-funded by the EU Directorate General for Health and 
Consumers. The project quantified the health effects of heat 
in European cities and identified options for improving the 
preparedness and response of health systems to protect health 
from heat waves. Its activities contributed to the implementa-
tion of the Declaration of the Fourth WHO Ministerial 
Conference on Environment and Health and of the European 
Commission’s Environment and Health Action Plan. 
One of the core findings of the project was that the adverse 
health effects of heat waves are largely preventable if certain 
conditions are met (WHO Europe 2008b). One outcome of 
these activities is the web-based heat wave forecasting tool 
called EuroHEAT (http://www.euroheat-project.org/dwd/
index.php). This tool is based on the Ensemble Prediction 
Systems (EPS) of the European Centre for Medium Range 
Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) and consists of a 50 member 
ensemble. EPS simulates possible initial uncertainties by 
adding, to the original initial conditions, small perturbations 
within the limits of uncertainty of the initial data. This creates 
an ensemble of slightly different initial conditions. Each 
ensemble member is then used as starting point for a forecast. 
Instead of one forecast with a specific starting date and lead 
time, an EPS produces an ensemble of forecasts. The skill 
of the EPS forecast is very good for short lead times, but 
decreases significantly with increasing lead times.
Table 1. Measures and strategies in existing Heat Health Warning Systems (HHWS) and heat plans
Measure, strategy Level of implementation Comments
Media announcements (radio, television) +++ Provide general advice on heat stress avoidance to general public
Bulletin or webpage +++ May be restricted access, to relevant professionals or accessed by anybody
Leaflets ++ General advice, and advice for nursing home managers. Often distributed at 
beginning of the summer via health centres, and places where vulnerable 
people may be
Telephone help-line ++ Either a dedicated telephone service is opened (e.g. Heatline in Portugal) or 
people are encouraged to phone a pre-existing general health advice line 
(e.g. NHS Direct in the UK)
Opening of cooling centres ++ Some evidence that cooling centres not used by high-risk individuals, but 
used by low-risk individuals
Alert to hospital emergency rooms, 
ambulance services
+ Used to improve operational efficiency (e.g. if need to deploy extra staff). 
Needs to be based on local information and carefully evaluated
Home outreach visits to vulnerable 
persons
+ Important but usually expensive. Use pre-existing networks of volunteers 
(e.g. Buddy systems in Philadelphia), or professionals (e.g. social workers). 
Requires some registry of vulnerable people
Evacuation of vulnerable persons from 
their homes to cooling centres
+ Using a registry of vulnerable people, who are visited at home, and 
evacuated, if necessary
Outreach to homeless + High-risk group in southern US (11 homeless people died in heatwave in 
Phoenix, July 2005)
Electricity companies cease disconnection 
for non-payment
+++ Utility companies have initiated and financially supported HHWS in the US. 
Most important where population relies on heavily air conditioning (as in 
the US)
Water companies cease disconnection for 
non-payment
+
Fan distribution ++ Fans are effective when they circulate cooler air, but not above temperatures 
∼37°C
+ rarely implemented, ++ often implemented, +++ very often implemented
Source: Kovats and Ebi 2006.
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EuroHEAT is a good example of a social learning process 
derived from recent heat waves. It is European in scope, and 
integrates different weather forecast models. There is no heat 
action plan underlying the heat early warning system, but 
with respect to a Pan-European heat wave risk governance 
structure this could be changed. 
4 Towards Heat Wave Risk Governance
As we have seen in the previous sections, heat waves already 
pose a serious threat to European societies, and it is expected 
that climate change will increase the frequency and the inten-
sity of European heat waves. Many agencies, including 
weather forecasting organizations, have reacted and devel-
oped heat health early warning systems. In principle, the 
heterogeneity of methods and procedures followed is not 
a problem. Regional and local conditions vary and lead to 
different vulnerabilities. In addition, there is always some 
path dependency in the development of HHWS, given the 
traditions and the capacities of national weather services. 
Against this background, the plurality of warning systems 
in Europe is an asset, and one can refer to principles of sub-
sidiarity and federalismiv in order to justify it. Coordination, 
cooperation, and learning have to be improved, however, in 
order to avoid additional heat wave deaths. In addition, 
forecasting and warning systems have to be based on a com-
prehensive risk analysis, as weather baselines can be expected 
to shift due to climate change, and as societies have to get 
prepared in order to assess realistically the potential damages 
of more frequent heat waves.
Thus the question arises: How might an improved heat 
wave risk governance architecture for Europe look like that 
capitalizes on the flexibility of systems and variety of nation-
al approaches, one that at the same time ensures comparabil-
ity, cooperation, and a comprehensive analysis of changing 
risk conditions? First of all, we think it appropriate to charac-
terize what we mean by risk governance, and why we assume 
it to be indispensable in the case of heat waves in Europe, 
before we give an outline of such an architecture. 
4.1 Risk Governance
While risk management refers to all measures that deal with 
a given risk, the term risk governance explicitly takes into 
account the complexity of risks as well as the heterogeneity 
of the social institutions and organizations that deal with 
them. We have outlined the necessity of such a governance 
approach to risk in programmatic terms in another paper 
(Shi et al. 2010). Here we would like to apply the approach to 
heat waves. 
Risk governance deals with the identification, assessment, 
management, and communication of risks in a broad context 
(IRGC 2005, 2008; Shi et al. 2010). It includes the totality 
of actors, rules, conventions, processes, and mechanisms 
involved in managing risks, is concerned with how relevant 
risk information is collected, analyzed, and communicated, 
and evaluates how management decisions are taken. It applies 
the principles of good governance (such as transparency, 
effectiveness, efficiency, and acceptability) to the domain of 
risk research and risk management (Jaeger et al. 2001). 
The benefits of good risk governance are quite clear. It 
avoids inequitable distribution of risks and benefits between 
countries, organizations, and social groups, deals with differ-
ent approaches to assessing and managing the same risk, 
considers political boundary conditions and trade-offs, and 
takes into account economic costs and public perceptions. 
On a national scale, governance describes structures and 
processes for collective decision making involving govern-
mental and nongovernmental actors (Nye and Donahue 2000). 
Governing various choices in modern societies is seen as 
an interplay between governmental institutions, economic 
organizations, and civil society actors (such as NGOs). At the 
global level, governance embodies a horizontally organized 
structure of functional self-regulation that encompasses state 
and non-state actors and brings about collectively binding 
decisions without superior authority (Rosenau 1992). In this 
perspective, non-state actors play an increasingly relevant 
role and become more important, since they have decisive 
advantages of information and resources compared to single 
states.
But governance is not confined to strictly political issues 
or levels. The important point for our analysis is that gover-
nance approaches are meaningful and necessary if simple 
coordination measures of political bodies do not suffice, but 
nonpolitical actors are essential for the problem definition 
and solving. Heat waves transcend the capacity of govern-
ment agencies, as knowledge and information providers 
(science, weather services), and economic and other social 
actors are required in order to generate and provide relevant 
knowledge as well as to design and implement meaningful 
action. We thus argue that risk governance is necessary for 
coping with heat waves in Europe.
4.2 Risk Governance Framework for Heat Waves 
Risk governance includes five major elements: a pre-
assessment of risk, risk appraisal, risk judgment, risk 
management, and risk communication (IRGC 2005, 2008). 
It is important to link these elements in a meaningful and 
sequential way (Figure 3). While these steps do have a clear 
time sequence, it is also important to see that recursive loops 
are necessary as well.
We start from the sequential loop of the above mentioned 
elements, and enrich them with respect to heat wave risks as 
we have discussed above. It is worth noting that risk gover-
nance sits at the interface of analysis and understanding on 
the one hand, and decision making and action on the other. 
This holds in particular when scientific questions play a key 
role in understanding specific issues. In the case of heat 
waves, climate change induced risk amplification is a good 
example.
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4.2.1 Heat Wave Risk Pre-Appraisal
The first step for any analyst of risk is to come up with a 
scoping of heat wave risks in the context of other risks, and 
a qualitative assessment of the framing of heat waves. Given 
the fact that heat wave risk analysis has become a research 
and, in part, an action area in its own right, this step might 
seem superfluous. But as it is always helpful to rethink 
routine assumptions of certain communities, it is necessary to 
readjust the underlying risk definitions for heat waves from 
time to time, to compare them with other risks (not only 
those associated with climate change), and to find out how 
important social stakeholders (for example policy branches, 
business communities, NGOs) understand the issue and how 
they want to deal with it. In the same line of thought, existing 
regulations for heat wave management have to be briefly (and 
repeatedly) reviewed in order to adapt risk governance 
schemes to new developments. 
This would already hold if heat waves could be perceived 
as natural climate variations exclusively, as some extreme 
events in the range of “normal” stochastic extremes might 
shift the way decision makers or the wider public perceives 
them (for example shifting from nuisance to disaster). This 
prospect is even more likely as heat waves become more 
frequent and intense due to anthropogenic climate change, 
and as risk baselines will shift measured either as a frequentist 
return period or as a Bayesian prior belief.v 
For that same reason, a heat wave pre-appraisal also needs 
to identify the climate discourse of a given region or country.vi 
It makes a huge difference whether, for example, the climate 
discourse is focusing on the attribution question—is there 
anthropogenic climate change or not—, or whether it has 
moved to a next phase in which different solutions are 
debated (Reusswig 2010). In that sense, one can argue that the 
European heat wave of 2003 has helped to bring about such a 
new climate change discourse, and that the establishment of 
heat health warning systems in many parts of Europe took 
place under the auspices of this new climate change discourse. 
In contrast, we find that in Russia climate change is much 
debated and more controversial—as it is in the U.S.—and that 
this oil and gas exporting country finds it difficult to accept 
officially the ongoing anthropogenic global climate change as 
a risk. Instead, leading Russian politicians as well as some 
Russian climate scientists either neglect climate change 
altogether, or assess it as having a net beneficial effect on the 
Russian economy. After the severe heat wave that hit Russia 
in summer 2010 the perception may change: Still Russian 
meteorologists, looking at instrumental records in Moscow of 
the last 130 years and a Gaussian probability distribution, 
came to the conclusion that this extreme event would occur 
only every 5,000 years; but on the other hand prominent 
politicians and experts put the extreme event in the context of 
anthropogenic climate change (Shuster 2010).
4.2.2 Heat Wave Risk Appraisal
Risk appraisals are the cognitive core elements of any risk 
governance scheme. The appropriate assessment of what is 
creating the risk, and how, is a central prerequisite for any 
practical risk management strategy. There are two major 
Figure 3. Schematic elements of a heat wave risk governance framework
Source: Modified after IRGC 2005.
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aspects we would like to highlight here: risk assessment and 
concern assessment. 
The risk assessment component deals with questions 
of probability and potential damage, or adverse effects. The 
systematic screening of historical records of heat waves in 
particular regions is crucial, but scientific findings that test 
for future developments, changing baselines, and interactions 
of different risks are also imperative. Case studies of historic 
events provide important insights into the vulnerability of 
particular systems, regions, and social groups. They help 
to establish a common knowledge base for cause-effect rela-
tions that have to be addressed when it comes to designing 
management options. 
An important question is what scientific, technical, and 
analytical approaches, knowledge, and expertise should be 
used to (better) assess the adverse impacts of heat waves. In 
this context it is important to remember that existing heat 
wave management practices can be seen as “incorporated 
knowledge,” schemes that are based upon some underlying 
risk assumptions that are not necessarily made transparent, 
may be because most agents take them for granted. If 
baselines for heat waves shift due to climate change, such 
taken-for-granted assumptions underlying management 
practices have to be reviewed critically, and tested against 
scenarios for different futures. In this respect it is crucial to 
become aware of the theories, organizations, and persons 
that—for any given region—are or may become relevant to 
assessing the risk of heat waves, such as climatologists, 
medical specialists, social workers, key administrative staff, 
and social scientists. Providing a flexible and adaptive knowl-
edge base is crucial for risk governance—both with respect to 
theoretical concepts and to organizations and persons. 
In Europe, the 2003 heat wave triggered much research as 
well as the establishment of different early warning systems 
at the national and local levels. Despite a flurry of activities 
concerning climate change and a growing interest in the 
research community, heat wave risk assessments remain 
fragmented, and basic tools for facilitating good decision 
making are lacking (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2011). A Europe-
wide approach to improve the knowledge base for heat wave-
related risk appraisal is needed. We suggest an initiative to 
integrate the empirical findings and, most of all, the methods 
of short-term research, assessment, and monitoring activities 
(Fink et al. 2004; Koppe et al. 2004; Kosatsky and Menne 
2005; Michelozzi et al. 2005; Robine et al. 2008) into existing 
institutionalized activities, whereby sectoral and standardized 
assessments have to be accelerated in specific domains 
(Lissner et al. 2011). We suggest the International Disaster 
Database (EM-DAT) at the Center for Research on the Epide-
miology of Disasters (CRED) at the School of Public Health 
in Louvain’s University to be the best suited institution for 
this purpose (http://www.emdat.be/). The European Union 
seems the most appropriate organization to fund the integra-
tion of findings and the transfer methods of leading European 
research groups into the EM-DAT monitoring scheme. It 
could also usefully fund consulting and outreach capacities at 
CRED in order to provide national and local risk managers 
with relevant information of how to create regionally adapted 
risk-related information bases. It is important to involve 
WHO Europe with its head office in Copenhagen in the 
creation of such an activity for capacity building in order to 
improve the salience of health-related information. 
Risk assessments deal with probabilities and potential 
damages, but they do not cover the whole range of a compre-
hensive risk appraisal. We additionally suggest a concern 
appraisal, addressing the social representation of heat wave 
risks. While from a purely natural science point of view it 
might seem unnecessary or even detrimental to ask for social 
concerns in addition to the classical dimensions of risk, from 
a risk governance perspective it is crucial to do so. What are 
the public’s concerns and perceptions of heat waves? What is 
the social response to heat wave risks? Is there the possibility 
of political mobilization or potential conflict? What roles do 
existing institutions, governance structures, and the media 
play in defining public concerns? Which socioeconomic 
damages can be expected from heat waves? Questions such as 
these have to be answered in order to design a viable manage-
ment strategy. They reflect the fact that the results of climate 
science do not influence a society’s climate discourse per se. 
Only what passes the filter of social amplification or down-
play, for which the mass media representation of (past) heat 
waves and climate change in general is crucial, meaningfully 
affect public discourse and understanding of the problem. 
Thus we contend that the CRED updated monitoring and 
outreach activity should be accompanied by a mass media 
analysis unit that collects and critically analyzes European 
mass media coverage of heat wave-related events. In cases of 
mass media misrepresentation of facts and causal attributions, 
CRED could also inform local and national risk managers 
about improved information strategies. 
4.2.3 Heat Wave Risk Judgment
While risk assessments make up the core of the scientific 
analysis and understanding of risks, risk judgments are situ-
ated at the interface between analysis and action. The term 
judgment explicitly refers to the dimension of valuation in all 
assessments and aims at a more conscious, systematic, and 
transparent mode of risk evaluation. Risk judgment has two 
major components: risk characterization and risk evaluation.
Risk characterization, lending itself more to the analytical 
side, focuses on the health and socioeconomic effects of heat 
waves and tries to qualify different qualitative and quantita-
tive profiles of risk situations. As we have seen, hot spell and 
heat wave mean different things for different locations, 
depending on the existing adaptive capacity of established 
behaviors and infrastructures. This means that heat wave risk 
profiles differ across and between regions. 
As risk profiles are area specific, their realization depends 
on area profiles that identify the vulnerable regions, sectors, 
and groups in a given region. This again requires a sound 
book-keeping with respect to past heat wave events in the 
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same region. For this purpose official statistics, past mass 
media reports, and oral or other reports from people affected 
or responsible for risk management are helpful. At the same 
time, comparisons with past experiences of other regions 
deliver valuable insights, as climate change will shift the 
baselines for risk assessments. The method of climate 
analogies is a very useful tool here (Hallegatte, Hourcade, and 
Ambrosi 2007; Hallegatte and Corfee-Morlot 2011). 
This also means that heat wave management schemes in 
place elsewhere are also relevant for assessing and improving 
a specific area’s risk profile. There are many studies avail-
able—again most of them triggered by the 2003 heat wave—
that compare early warning systems and other heat wave 
management systems. In order to enable risk managers to 
learn from good practice, the European Union should fund a 
continuous effort to compare these systems in a coherent 
manner, building upon existing experience both from Euro-
pean research projects and from specialized organizations 
such as WHO. We propose to institutionalize such a heat 
wave management monitoring activity at The Monitoring and 
Information Centre (MIC), a branch under the auspices of 
the European Commission’s Mechanism for Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (http://ec.europa.eu/echo/civil_
protection/civil/prote/mic.htm). 
Risk evaluation makes up the second pillar of risk judg-
ment, lending itself more to the decision and action side of 
risk governance. Here normative and evaluative aspects do 
come explicitly to the fore. What are the values at risk in case 
of heat waves? What ethical problems or conflicts arise? 
Which potential damages are tolerable and acceptable, and 
for whom? What does a disaster mean for particular sectors or 
groups, especially for vulnerable individuals and communi-
ties who are often neglected, such as the homeless or tourists? 
What costs—in a wider sense, including not only monetary 
but also organizational and psychological costs—are attached 
to particular risk reduction options, and who will have to 
bear them? Are there any co-benefits from heat wave risk 
reduction options, and where/to whom do they accrue? 
It is important to deal with these questions in an open, 
transparent manner at this stage of the risk governance 
process. If these political questions are not addressed 
early enough—and many scientists tend to leave them to 
politicians—conflicts over management priorities and the 
allocation of scarce resources will become much more 
difficult later. 
As a result of risk characterization and risk evaluation, the 
feasible management option space for a given region should 
become clear. This option space should not only cover what 
could be done in case of upcoming heat waves, but also deter-
mine what are the most effective and efficient measures with 
which to cope with climate perturbations. 
4.2.4 Heat Wave Risk Management
The management of heat waves clearly is the practical core of 
risk governance, and the reason and goal for the whole opera-
tion. Risk management involves the design and implementa-
tion of the actions and remedies required to avoid, reduce, 
transfer, or retain the risks. Questions of organization, imple-
mentation, and learning are at its heart. Risk management 
includes the generation, assessment, evaluation, and selection 
of appropriate risk reduction options as well as implementing 
the selected measures, monitoring their effectiveness, and 
reviewing the decision if necessary.
As a first step, the definition and set-up of the risk manage-
ment process and the involved actors and organizations are 
crucial. Who should be involved, who can bring in specific 
competences and responsibilities, and what will be the lines 
of decision making and communication? In this domain it 
becomes clear why the term “risk governance” is more 
appropriate than “risk government.” Government processes 
refer to more or less hierarchical structures in public agencies, 
where the assigned staff and its communication and decision 
lines are clear—at least in principle. While government 
bodies (such as municipal departments or the police) do play 
an important role in risk management, they are not the only 
relevant actors. In the case of managing heat wave risks, the 
required set of agents comprises hospitals, medical doctors, 
retirement home managers, landlords, urban planners, facility 
managers, entrepreneurs, civil society organizations, and 
active citizens at large. It is impossible to organize these 
heterogeneous actors in a top-down manner, as government 
organizations typically do. Instead, cooperative forms of 
coordinated action are required, combining elements of 
top-down control with those of motivation, consultation, and 
voluntary cooperation. The handling of these hybrid forms 
of coordinated action requires skills in governing (not 
commanding and controlling) social networks rather than 
heading a single agency. Experienced individual agency heads 
may very well be qualified to govern these networks, but 
mostly due to additional skills acquired through long-term, 
on-the-job experience. 
Heat wave risk management needs an early warning sys-
tem. As we have seen, such systems operate in most European 
countries. Yet they are based on different methods. Heat 
waves can occur locally, and heat wave vulnerabilities vary 
considerably between cities and regions. It is thus reasonable 
to follow different approaches across Europe. But in view 
of trans-boundary heat waves, as well as in view of the 
allocation of European organizational capacity and funds, a 
coherent European early warning culture has to emerge. 
National weather services have been the major drivers of 
existing heat wave early warning systems, and their respec-
tive meteorological approaches have shaped the multitude 
of currently co-existing event risk definitions and thresholds 
for specific actions. While plurality may be a strength, frag-
mentation is not. Needed is a nested European early warning 
system that evolves from existing systems, accompanying the 
other integrative governance efforts we have mentioned so 
far. The Europe-wide, web-based prognostic tool EuroHEAT, 
based upon ensemble predictions for heat waves, could be the 
nucleus for the final integration version of these efforts. It is 
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crucial that the development process of a Pan-European heat 
wave early warning system is not driven by meteorological 
considerations (and agencies) alone. It is essential to keep in 
mind that an early warning system is not primarily an add-
on service of meteorological offices, but the first step in a 
disaster management process. As such, other actors must be 
involved, bringing in all aspects of relevant information, 
timelines, degree of details, necessary supporting data and 
interpretation materials, and understandable communication. 
The next broad step is to develop locally/regionally 
adopted measures to reduce exposure to heat waves. As many 
victims die before they reach the hospital, such a step is 
crucial in order to reduce mortality. There are multiple ways 
of reducing individual heat exposure. This includes individua l 
behavioral measures, short-, medium-, and long-term housing 
measures, and long-term improved urban planning, building 
design, and transport and energy policies. Short-term mea-
sures include advice on behavior, provisioning of access to 
cool spaces, as well as the allocation of mobile evaporation 
coolers and room air conditioners. Medium-term measures 
include increasing the albedo of the building envelope, 
external shading, insulation, decreasing the internal heat load, 
the provisioning of passive cooling technologies, and 
efficient active cooling. Long-term measures encompass the 
adaptation of building regulations, urban planning, land-use 
changes, and mitigation of climate change (Matthies and 
Menne 2009; U.S. EPA 2006; WHO Europe 2008a, 2008b). 
It is clear that this very broad package of measures not 
only asks for the coordination of a multitude of actors, but 
also for the integration of heat wave risk management into 
other policy and planning areas. This implies that different 
processes and timelines are involved. While information 
campaigns for triggering behavior changes can be imple-
mented rather rapidly and need but a small network of agents, 
changing building legislations and codes may take several 
years, and requires the involvement of national agencies, 
governments, political parties, and parliaments, among 
others. Here again, a European focal point for heat wave risk 
governance could help to push national legislations, e.g. by 
providing facts, experience, and future impact scenarios.
While a general information campaign is indispensable, 
more specialized and probably more personalized informa-
tion is needed in order to reach particular target groups, 
such as isolated elderly or homeless people. Social scientists 
and communication specialists will be needed to tailor infor-
mation to their needs and capacities, and other actors relevant 
to the everyday life practices of those groups (health care 
organizations, health insurance agencies, social assistance 
agencies, local nodal points, such as shelters, shopping 
centers, or meeting rooms) must be engaged in the effort. 
Mass media campaigns not only require sound information, 
they also need to be communicated by credible and accepted 
people; the same holds true for personalized information, in 
which case a specialized staff needs extra training.vii
A next necessary step is to develop emergency plans 
for those instances when a particular threshold of the early 
warning process has been passed. Again, the relevant actor 
network has to be first defined, and communication and 
decision procedures, together with responsibilities, have to be 
agreed upon. An affected region or city has to identify and 
assign cooling rooms that the general public can easily access 
(such as public buildings); it has to design and implement 
emergency action plans for hospitals, retirement homes 
and kindergartens; it should suspend shut-offs of utilities 
for individuals during heat events; and it should reschedule 
public events to avoid large outdoor gatherings when possi-
ble. Businesses in the region whose employees work outside 
should also develop behavior guidelines and implement emer-
gency plans. Public authorities should install (and communi-
cate) phone hotlines, and national weather services, together 
with telecommunications operators, should offer specialized 
information for mobile phones. 
This bundle of measures will not only vary from region to 
region, according to the outcomes of the risk judgment phase. 
It will also vary over time, given the learning process due to 
implementation experiences and new ideas from elsewhere. 
Monitoring the outcomes of management plans and the 
provisioning of learning capacities (for instance extra staff 
members, or extra time reserved for evaluation exercises) is a 
necessary step towards a resilient, learning network of heat 
risk governance agencies. 
4.2.5 Risk Communication
Finally, the critical importance of communication should be 
emphasized briefly—last but not least. Its role has already 
been mentioned several times in this article. This is not 
accidental. In fact, communication is an essential factor for 
successful risk governance (Renn 2008) as well as for many 
climate change adaptation situations (Hinkel et al. 2009). 
This holds for two sets of reasons. On the one hand, the 
heterogeneity of actors at various scales makes it essential to 
communicate in order to create and maintain action capacity. 
On the other hand, the variety of agencies and publics that 
heat risk governance has to address requires flexible forms of 
communication in order to get heard and understood. 
One might call the first aspect internal communication 
(within the actor network), while the second one refers to 
external communication with those institutions and groups 
that provide necessary information or are addressed as poten-
tial users. While it might be impossible to institutionalize 
these two strands in a separate organization, it is indispens-
able that all actors involved in the governance network should 
be aware of the necessity to get the communication side 
right. 
5 Conclusion
The study of recent evidence of heat wave-related mortality 
data indicates that while economic wealth and technological 
capacity might be a necessary condition for adequately 
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coping with adverse climate change effects, they are hardly 
sufficient. The death toll of recent heat waves in developed 
countries has been remarkably high, contradicting the 
common assumption that scoring high in economic and tech-
nological indicators automatically leads to low vulnerability 
to weather extremes. Due to climate change, heat waves can 
be expected to become more frequent, adding to the challenge 
posed by climate impacts and raising the question of the 
adaptive capacity of even the developed countries to climate 
change. 
After the 2003 heat wave, many European countries 
underwent a remarkable process of social learning and imple-
mented heat health warming systems. But phenomena like the 
death toll of the summer 2006 heat wave in many European 
countries with heat health warning systems in place demon-
strates that there are still gaps in implementation, and that 
many European countries have not yet developed sufficient 
action plans and responses. 
Questions of awareness, preparedness, organizational 
issues, and actor networks have to be addressed in a proactive 
and focused manner in order to decrease future heat wave 
damages considerably. We propose practical consequences 
for heat wave adaptation measures by adopting a risk gover-
nance framework that can be universally applied as it is 
sufficiently flexible to deal with the multi-level and often 
fragmented reality of existing coping measures. The proposed 
risk governance framework can give structure to processes of 
social learning that decrease the vulnerabilities of societies to 
weather extremes, whatever their future frequency may be. 
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Notes
i According to our simplified ontology we understand by natural sys-
tems mainly uncontrolled ecosystems, such as wild living animals, 
oceans, or wild forests; by semi-natural systems mainly controlled 
systems such as managed forests, agricultural systems, or the world’s 
livestock; by technical systems such human designed and managed 
artifacts as houses, machines, or technical infrastructures (roads, 
power lines, or similar constructions); and by social systems we 
intend human institutions and societies, including human agents 
and their bodies. We are well aware that this is a somewhat arbitrary 
categorization, as there are gradual differences. Nevertheless we 
need some ideal types to clarify what we focus upon.
ii As most human dominated ecosystems are less diverse than natural 
ones (the species composition of natural rain forests compared to that 
of nearby plantations, for example), they are less resilient and show 
a greater dependency on external intervention, such as provisioning 
of nutrients or water. This makes human-dominated ecosystems usu-
ally more vulnerable than natural ones.
iii Demographic effects will aggravate climate change risks, as the 
proportion of the elderly in Europe will increase dramatically. In 
2004, 75.3 million of the 456.8 million EU 25 inhabitants were older 
than 65, and 18.2 million older than 80. In 2050, EU 25 will have 
about 453.8 million inhabitants, but 133.3 million will be 65+, and 
49.9 million will be 80+ (DG ECFIN 2006).
iv We refer to the European notion of federalism that focuses on the 
decentralist perspective of a federal structure, as for example realized 
in Germany, in contrast to a centralist political and administrative 
tradition, for which in Europe France still provides a good example.
v Frequentists define probabilities on the basis of historical 
frequencies (e.g. tumbling a dice ideally an infinite number of 
times), wherea s Bayesians define them as subjective measures of 
un certainty. There is, therefore, a frequentist and a Bayesian concept 
of probability.
vi “A climate change discourse is a thematically focused and (more 
or less) coupled sequence of publicly visible arguments in various 
contexts (or framings) that different social actors are engaged in, in 
order to influence (1) one another, (2) specific boundary conditions 
of social action (such as politics), and (3) the general public so that 
the resource endowments, interests and worldviews of the speaking 
actors have a higher chance to prevail in the social interpretation and 
individual or collective decision making processes” (Reusswig and 
Lass 2010, 158).
vii If funds for heat wave risk management do not allow for specialized 
permanent staff, it might be equally effective to train other staff that 
communicates with vulnerable target groups on a regular basis.
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